Colorado Secretary of State comments on Ion Sancho video concerning “Diebold” Precinct Optical Scanners

Here is a video that was posted on FaceBook and has been seen on FB at least 6,563,489 times. It shows how easy it was to change results on a formerly Diebold precinct optical scanner of a type still used in Colorado. It features famed Leon County Florida Election Supervisor Ion Sancho and also Harri Hursti, a well known election technologist.

Here are some of the comments on a recent posting of the video, starting with those by the Colorado Secretary of State and followed by my own.

Colorado does have safeguards to prevent unauthorized access to memory cards but these could be circumvented depending on local conditions. This particular machine carries significant firmware for the device in the memory card that makes it particularly susceptible. It is our goal to make the pre-election testing and the post election audit sufficient to signal the public when a fraud or error is occurring. From my experience the Secretary’s level of confidence is not justified by our processes and equipment just yet. Improvements have been made as part of the Uniform Voting System project.

Wayne Williams This video does not reflect Colorado requirements. Memory cards are secured. In addition, 95% of Coloradans vote by mail, so there is obviously a paper ballot record. The new in person voting systems that I approved and that have been adopted in 18 counties have a paper ballot for in person voters as well. Even the older machines have to have a paper record to be legal in Colorado. Plus, we compare the machines to hand counts both before and after the election. So while I can’t say this can’t happen anywhere, it can’t happen in Colorado.
Like · Reply · 1 · 14 hrs
Joshua Raines Thank you Wayne! Keep up the great work!


Harvie Branscomb In the video is well respected Leon County Florida Election Supervisor Ion Sancho and election quality activist Harri Hursti. The voting device shown is still used in Colorado especially in municipal elections. Broomfield and Pitkin Counties stopped using it only this year. The statutory post election audit that we use in Colorado has defects and can easily miss errors in tabulation that would alter an outcome. We are slated to move to a much more effective risk limiting audit in 2017 but surprisingly little preparation has been made for the transition. Our Colorado recount law (because of a poorly chosen denominator for the trigger threshold) is at least half as sensitive as that of many states and during a recount the same machines are used that can replicate tabulation errors that occurred in the first count.
Harvie Branscomb To make our statutory post election audit effective more than 500 ballots ought to be audited in large counties and the number should depend on the unofficial margin for each contest- more ballots selected for audit in case of a narrower victory margin. The way ballots are chosen for audit currently is rarely actually random and this lack of randomness will harm the value of the audit. And finally many counties do not audit by comparing a hand count to election night results, although this year a new rule will cause more counties that can to do so. When you look at the details of these integrity defending practices you find many places where improvements are needed.
Harvie BranscombOur new voting systems in 18 counties do provide machine printed paper copies that the voter can handle during in person voting but these copies encode the voter intent in what amounts to an electronic ballot printed into a QR code. That QR code isn’t voter verifiable. Not all counties allow voters to mark a paper ballot in person and cast it in the polling place without sending the ballot into the mail ballot signature verification process that can lead to the ballot not being counted until a letter from the clerk is responded to. The Colorado model can definitely be improved upon.
Here is a link to the FaceBook page containing the video:

Denver Post editorial supports Harvie Branscomb’s attempt to audit anonymous voted ballots

Voted ballots still too hard to access

Friday, Nov. 20, 2015 – 4:06 p.m.

Volunteers count ballots in Saguache County on Aug. 31, 2011. (AAron Ontiveroz, Denver Post file)

Coloradans achieved the important right to review voted ballots as open records through a costly legal battle culminating in a state court of appeals victory in 2011.

And the legislature affirmed this critical citizen right to see voted ballots in a bill it passed the following year.

But did the victory count for anything?

Do citizens really possess the right to review the work of elected county clerks after elections are over?

The answer seems to be they do if they’ve got a lot of money, and that’s unacceptable.

Election integrity activist Harvie Branscomb found this out when he served open records requests to eight counties after the Nov. 3 elections, seeking to independently audit the accuracy of new voting equipment being tested as a part of a state pilot program.

As reported by Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition Director Jeffrey Roberts, Branscomb’s request to verify the Nov. 3 elections in those counties would cost him thousands of dollars.

Of the eight counties, six have said he must pay a total of about $20,000 in advance so officials can scan ballots for marks that could identify voters and redact the scribbles.

Only Adams County said the cost would be “near zero” to review and redact 73,103 ballot scans. Denver has yet to say how much it would cost.

But Jefferson County asked for an advance payment of $12,475 to review and redact 185,000 ballots. Douglas County sought $4,000 to review 88,000 ballots, and Mesa County asked for $1,500 to view 29,000 ballots.

Adams County says its system would allow it to quickly scan images of its ballots to look for markings and the cost would be next to nothing.

The Adams County vendor, Clear Ballot, is one of four being considered for statewide use. As Secretary of State Wayne Williams considers which of the four systems might be best for the state, one of his criteria should be the ease with which officials can comply with open records requests at a reasonable cost.

Legislation from 2012 gave election officials the authority to charge “actual costs” for records requests, but if the result is prohibitive, then the right to the records is meaningless.

Putting such high costs on a citizen’s efforts to examine voted ballots restricts public access and cripples an important check on election integrity.

New voting technology should make transparency easier, not the other way around.

To send a letter to the editor about this article, submit online or check out our guidelines for how to submit by e-mail or mail.

Harvie Branscomb’s  posted records request threads are in this article:

Denver Post article about Colorado obstacles to flow of public records under CORA

I commented on a Denver Post article about Colorado obstacles to flow of public records under CORA:

I rely on open records (CORA) to be able to verify election results- something that newly available voting systems available to Colorado can facilitate. New systems enable election verification by anyone interested: campaigns, political parties, integrity advocates, etc, Colorado is testing four systems now. I have been asked by some counties to pay thousands of dollars to have otherwise available scans of ballots checked for identifying marks. Other counties are simply making sure the ballots are anonymous as part of their transparency service. Here is more about that story:

Should I as a member of the public be required to pay to make sure that all voters followed the constitutional requirement not to mark the ballot with their signature? Mail-in voters have to sign the envelope, but never the ballot inside. When the ballot comes out of the envelope it must become anonymous to protect the privacy of the voter’s intent. In Colorado this protection is provided only when after the election someone asks to see the anonymous ballots and it turns out not all of them are. That person asking is required to pay to have all the ballots checked for the signatures that should not be there.

But the anonymous ballot is by law a public record. Huge charges to a requestor form an inappropriate obstacle to the flow of an important public record.

More information is available in the previous post:…routefifty-com/

Harvie Branscomb’s effort to obtain evidence from Colorado pilot elections covered by

From the article:

Carbondale-based election integrity activist Harvie Branscomb is asking county clerks to make available voted ballots in eight counties that in last week’s elections performed test runs of four pilot voting systems, systems which “have never before been used in Colorado and in some cases have never before been used anywhere,” as Branscomb put it in a letter to the Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition and shared with Route Fifty. Branscomb wants to retabulate the results produced by the new systems and check them against the ballots and look for anomalies…

Here is the link:

Here is a related story about open records requests in Colorado that introduces  a new report.

Here is the underlying report about Colorado’s lack of facilitation of transparency.

The “Electoral Oversight”  portion is election specific- Colorado gets a “C” but gets full points for an “independent oversight” by the Secretary of State and other high marks I might not have given.  I doubt that an independent (voluntary)  election quality critic like myself was asked to peer review.   It may be interesting to study the details of this section for other states such as your own. The report may be entirely complete about  independent oversight that may or may not be there.

Pilots of voting systems not yet an adequate test of verification

The following is a letter to Colorado SOS staffer Dwight Shellman and members of Colorado’s Pilot Election Review Committee:

I’m including a message I sent to Dwight long ago.   Please include this in published public comment to the PERC committee on the SOS website. ( ).

Please send me the plans/schedule for the mock RLA and the test data dumps you got from the vendors.  And please send the spreadsheet that contains the schedule of election activities. I am shocked that it was not published on the SOS website, as far as I can tell. I have certificates of appointment for a statewide ballot issue committee to watch in any county.

While watching last week I also discovered by chance that the SOS issued apparently secret provisional watcher rules to some counties and asked them to pilot these. Fortunately the four pages of rules did not catch me by great surprise as they were the product of a committee I served on.  Why wouldn’t the public be made aware of that watcher pilot?  Perhaps not your department.

As you know I am  attempting to evaluate the tabulation accuracy of the four systems as well as their facility to support transparency in the service of election verification- not only in the future via a RLA (Risk Limiting Audit) but the facilitation of deeper dives into verification of election results for accuracy. At least one such deeper dive is definitely appropriate to do prior to this UVS (Uniform Voting System-s) decision.  I am attempting to do it and am facing ridiculous costs on the order of $20,000 – a sum accumulated from estimates of some of the counties for access to ballot scans. This has forced me to constrain my requests with the hope of getting useful access to evidence from these elections in a much smaller scope.  My efforts will be something closer to a pilot of the functional part of an “evidence based election” – something that election quality advocates like myself and many election officials seek.

I have no doubt that the counties have been corresponding about how to answer my requests. the CORA requests are rendered challenging by the limitations in CORA law and the opportunities of new technology at hand. Perhaps Adams and Denver have been responding without much coordination. Most other counties seem to think it will take 5 seconds to find identifying marks on one side of a ballot scan shown on a computer. I think that would be excruciatingly slow and disastrously expensive.

If the SOS office has exposure to these conversations by email I would appreciate seeing the content of the discussions.  I know you were cc:d one one county response to my request.  It is important for the process of public access to election records to be a part of the legislative agenda and rules agenda for the future. Huge opportunities can be missed by failing to address the benefits of some or all of these new voting systems. One such benefit would be for campaigns to locate potentially mis-adjudicated ballots and to systematically include any such discovery in the process of auditing the election so that higher accuracy could be obtained prior to certification – particularly with a narrow margin contest.

For my part I have posted (at  considerable expense of my time) all of the  threads of my conversations with the counties regarding the CORA requests for ballot designs as well as scans of tabulated ballots, cast vote records, and new scans of duplicated ballots. These conversations represent a large range of facilitation of public access to verify elections. No doubt we will not achieve a “uniform election system” by enforcing the use of one or two or whatever prescribed voting systems. The UVS is a well distributed, well worn myth and the counties seem to know it.  I hope the SOS does. I hope he becomes well aware of this transparency project and the benefits that it might produce.

The record of these CORA conversations under my commentary is located here:

Please be aware that the running of a normal low volume election with new voting systems does not necessarily produce the evidence of how these systems will perform in exceptional conditions or in case of narrow margins.  We must simulate these conditions or dig deeper into the evidence to see how they are performing in detail.  One such exceptional condition is the inevitable presence of people like me who will attempt to verify the accuracy of an election.  I have not noticed much simulation of that condition in the counties where I have been watching. In most cases I am the only  credentialed watcher who has appeared.

And of course thanks for making this a public process- something that some other states do not feel necessary. Simply the opportunity  to be involved is a very meaningful enhancement that I have every reason to appreciate and compliment. And thanks to the tireless efforts of many who are engaged in trying to get Colorado to a better election.

Harvie Branscomb

——– Forwarded Message ——–
Mon, 21 Sep 2015 14:42:40 -0600
Here I reprise my email of July 29 that refers again to the SOS preparation for RLA.

I understand that the past two PERC meetings were cancelled and that includes the meeting that would have included Philip Stark.  On 7/29 I asked again if I should ask you once more for the communications regarding RLA with the pilot counties. I do  not even yet know which 4 counties will conduct the RLA.

I am heavily involved with the Election Verification Network in a discussion of RLA and have been for years.  Philip Stark and Ron Rivest and many election officials and academics are part of that conversation.

It is clear that Colorado’s actions in November will be of great importance to the audit community nationwide and I plan to learn as much as I can about what Colorado is doing as well as to learn as much from the pilots.

I plan to CORA the PDFs of the ballot styles from the 8 counties involved in the audit so that by the time I get ballot images I may be in a position to independently tabulate them

——– Forwarded Message ——–

Subject: are we ready for risk limiting audits?
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 16:18:38 -0600
From: Harvie Branscomb

Dwight Shellman

Here is an excerpt of something I am sharing with election verification experts:

Fortunately as Phil Stark pointed out ballot level risk limiting audits do not require aggregating multiple ballots and only actually require capture and comparison of patterns off of single ballots at a time. However this is also not trivial and even newest systems are not necessarily providing data that has good human factors for this purpose.

It appears that machines are better than humans at counting up the number of pieces of paper in front of them. It seems unavoidable that machines fail to capture idiosyncratic voter intent when humans succeed. Therefore an ideal combination is found in the sort and stack method that can be combined with machine counting of pages. For example during a single contest recount it would be ideal to have human judges separate the ballots by voter choice and batch tabulate them such that all ballots in a batch (or on a particular scanner or memory card) are hand sorted to be a single voter choice. The scanner can then provide a machine count of sorted pages and a sub-tally of vote counts to confirm that it recognized all as voted for the specific choice. This will easily expose discrepancies that can be resolved by human observation and improve recount accuracy.

I am currently analyzing the first 8,000 of 130,000 ballot images and cast vote records from the Dominion system used in Denver CO (the much advertised and visited May municipal pilot election). The principal reason for my analysis is to learn what we need to know to guide the evaluation of such a pilot system from the point of view of auditing (and transparency)… auditing the audit as it were.

The format for the Cast Vote Records that were provided 1) as a separate text file aggregated by batch as well as 2) the “AuditMark” voter selection digital printout that is embedded with the 200dpi 1bit per pixel ballot image are not suitable for convenient machine tabulation and they aren’t particularly desirable for hand comparison either. Human usability concerns (as well as machine formatting compatibility concerns) abound in the design of forms and scanned images and reports that are needed for auditing. No doubt this issue is not limited to Dominion.

Our CO pilot review program seems insufficiently concerned about the ways that the risk limiting audit will take place. Perhaps more attention will be paid within the next few weeks. We have until November when five such pilots will take place as part of the 2015 election. At present it is uncertain what the instructions for a risk limiting audit will be and it is even more uncertain how we will know if we have done a good pilot audit.

Dwight I am deeply concerned that our pilot evaluations will fail to measure and document the crucial back office aspects of the systems even as they are in use in real elections. The evaluations of these systems in real elections crucially must look beyond the motions of successfully performing an unremarkable election.  The RLA is a big part of my concern and that is why I asked you to forward the communication to the vendors about preparations for the pilots. Should I ask for that again?

I am hoping that I will get enough information from Denver’s completed pilot in time to be able to make a sample partial evaluation of that system as an example for what the PERC or SOS could and should do as a minimum to evaluate each system. I am hoping I can do that before the PERC decisions on how and what to evaluate are made.  No doubt what I am doing by myself is not enough either.  I am already learning that the RLA may be painful with some systems. And the counties performing the pilots may have the tendency to act to defend the system rather than subject it to a critical evaluation in public. That should be a major concern of PERC and SOS and all Coloradans.

I don’t think my bi-weekly writings to the PERC have been productive but I do think that you can benefit from the information I am collecting.  By random chance after examining only a few ballot images in Denver I already found an incorrectly captured voter mark in the Dominion May pilot- but the CO evaluation must be in a position to find all of them for each piloted system. And system evaluators must be in a position to understand and evaluate the remedies offered by  the vendors.   A technique such as I have briefly described above for sorting before scanning if used for a top of ticket contest would get part of the way there and without spending much extra time.

Likewise the documentary products of each system (logs, settings, etc.) must be studied in detail and each document’s ability to convey exception cases and discrepancies evaluated.  Unfortunately I have not yet received any logs or reports from the Denver system, and the ballot images are coming slowly due to an understandable learning curve on privacy redaction. The timing of the PERC and any other SOS evaluation must allow for weeks of evaluation of reports and cast vote records and audits after the documents are produced. It will not be enough to say no one complained.

And on that matter, it is also important that well trained watchers/observers be present at the 10 pilots at important moments throughout –  of course including the ballot design, LAT and ballot prep and early tabulation and post election activities. And plans must be made for a super-LAT at each pilot that plans for potentially problematic ballots to be voted and results analyzed.  Remember what the clerks did to ballots for the UVS demo last year- crumpled them, etc.  Whatever the out of state certification is doing and whatever SOS is doing in house is probably insufficient to provide confidence about exceptional test cases and the ability of systems to detect, log and remedy these cases.

Finally you keep mentioning the hardware test and acceptance tests.  These are important and have been ignored in the past.  I think work should be done on what the hardware tests (every election) and acceptance tests (by county upon purchase) should be- and these tests should be performed with careful evaluation during the pilot or within its scope. Seening the lights come on and the system say “ready” doesn’t provide enough information.

Please send this to the PERC if you feel it is constructive to do so.

PS I just received the following link from Ron Rivest- another very well respected statistician working on elections – with a simple one page description of a RLA. Unfortunately it is still only the mathematicians description and not one for election officials. Someone should turn this (or similar mathematical instructions) into a clear and specific multi-county process (all 5 RLA pilots coordinated plus any other counties separately doing RLA?) for the state-wide issue on the ballot and within county audits for the remaining contests.  In this list of publications, the RLA description is number 311 or the second from the top at the moment.

Harvie Branscomb

Colorado Pilots of new voting systems allow technical evaluation through access to ballots

Colorado is tabulating the final numbers in the 2015 Coordinated Election.  Results on the Secretary of State (SOS) site are found here: Colorado 2015 results by county.

Eight counties are currently running their election with new hardware and voting system software from 4 companies.  On Dec. 15 the SOS Pilot Election Review Committee (PERC) will make a recommendation to the SOS about what system or systems should be made available for purchase by Colorado counties. Reportedly 24 counties are interested in purchasing replacement vote tabulation equipment (and software) in 2016 prior to primary elections. PERC is a public body and its meetings are recorded and testimony to it is posted here: CO SOS PERC website.

Reportedly on Dec. 31 2015 the Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams will decide what system or systems will be certified for purchase in Colorado.  It is my intention to conduct an in depth evaluation of the functionality of these four systems  using scans of individual ballots and the associated interpretations of those votes.

Each system creates an anonymous digital record of the marks on each ballot after a each is opened, scanned and then processed to detect the marks. Then exceptional cases are redirected to human adjudication as part of the paper ballot tabulation process The result is presumably an accurate representation of the anonymous voter intent. By checking potentially problematic looking marks on paper or on scans of paper in  comparison to the output recorded by the machine for that ballot I can locate ballots that might have been misinterpreted. And I can sum all these interpretations (called cast vote records) to check to see the published results match.

What I am describing is an evaluation of the tabulation portion of a paper ballot election. For practical reasons I will use scans of ballots rather than the actual paper as input.  Granted this is not the most perfect approach as the scans could fail to represent something marked on the ballot. Election officials already check some of the ballots to see if a hand count of these will balance against a machine count.  This is called the “post election audit.”  In 2017 Colorado will enjoy perhaps the first statewide Risk Limiting Audit  that will  caused judges to methodically hand check random paper ballots against the “cast vote records” and then sum all “cast vote records” to see if the election outcome would change if a hand count of all ballots were conducted.This is approach is part of an “evidence based election.”

A way to go beyond the maximally efficient risk limiting audit is to check more than a minimum number of ballots to see if they match the cast vote records – the records the ballot scanners produce for each ballot.  We could even retabulate the entire election from published scans if they are of high enough quality and can be trusted.  I have issued Open Records (CORA) requests to the eight counties to get access to these cast vote records and the scans of the voted ballots (after they are deemed to have had any identifying marks removed.) It is simply impractical to get physical access to count that many paper ballots, although I may attempt to check a random set of the scans against the paper if and when I have time. That would require a visit to each county.

What you will find on following pages is the record of the process of my attempt to get access to these important public records for the purpose of a one time massive evaluation of four new voting systems based on collected evidence at election scale. This is an unusual opportunity that is made possible by  far better technology in these new systems and Colorado’s transparency laws in the Colorado Open Records Act. What you may find is that there is  substantial lack of uniformity in the way the counties treat my requests and their custodianship of the public records.

Another thing that is really quite disturbing is that  our election officials are now clearly acknowledging the presence of identifying marks on the ballots although in reality there are probably very few. In Colorado the constitution requires – in Article VII Section 8- that “all elections by the people shall be by ballot, and in case paper ballots are required to be used, no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.”

According to our state constitution, it is illegal to make such a mark- whether the voter or an official does it. The state law ironically now authorizes counties to charge me as a member of the public to pay substantial and often insurmountable sums  to in effect hide   from myself the evidence of a constitutional violation. It would make so much more sense if the county  governments would prevent the identifying marks from being made or redact them at the moment of recognition. Then officials could reveal to the public through fulfilled records requests that the unconstitutional cases where identifying marks are present  have been remedied. One way many states handle this is to reject ballots that have been made identifiable. Thus they do not become part of a fulfilled request for all tabulated ballots.

What I hope to see is more  attention paid to transparency  so that Colorado can enjoy with the help of the new generation of voting systems the most verifiable and most verified elections in the United States.  The new technology is capable of it- and all that is needed now is an actively interested public and  election records custodians who are appreciative of the need for efficient and low cost public access. You will see in the records linked below that some of our officials are taking that approach.

Harvie Branscomb 11/9/2015

Links to county open records requests (CORA) conversations:

Adams quoted price near zero for about 73,103 ballot scans  = $0/ballot

read the Adams: 2015 CORA Conversation

Denver has not quoted a price yet for 80,019  ballot scans
read the Denver: 2015 CORA Conversation

Douglas quoted $4000 for 88,248 ballot scans  = 4.5 cents/ballot
read the Douglas: 2015 CORA Conversation

Garfield quoted  $990 for 11,172 ballot scans  = 8.8 cents/ballot

read the Garfield: 2015 CORA Conversation

Gilpin quoted only the cost of media for 1,519 ballot scans475273
read the Gilpin: 2015 CORA Conversation

Jefferson quoted $12500  for 185,467 ballot scans  = 6.7 cents/ballot
read the Jefferson: 2015 80019CORA Conversation73103+80019+

Mesa quoted $1500 for  29,154 ballot scans =  5.1 cents / ballot
read the Mesa: 2015 CORA Conversation

Teller quoted $550 for 6,591 ballot scans = 8.3 cents / ballot
read the Teller: 2015 CORA Conversation

Total number of ballot scans and cast vote records requested 475273 (plus some over under and late counted votes )… total  estimated number of ballots 395254 cost: $19540

The average cost for accessing an electronic copy of a voted anonymous ballot in CO is currently about 5 cents per ballot which means the cost to access ballots for a presidential election is about $100,000. Can you afford it?  I can’t.

Senator Hill’s HB1130: neither Senate nor House versions deserve adoption — too technical for conference committee repair

The following to Colorado Senators and the Secretary of State are comments in [brackets] by Harvie Branscomb on texts extracted from a memo signed by Secretary of State Wayne W. Williams concerning HB 15-1130.

Recommend lay over the consideration of House and Senate versions of Senator Hill’s HB15- 1130 until after Sine Die.

The three Senate amendments in current form are far from ideal. The Senate version of the bill is not much more workable than the House version. Neither contains appropriate accountability that is necessitated by the lack of SOS rules for Title 31 elections. Both remain Continue reading Senator Hill’s HB1130: neither Senate nor House versions deserve adoption — too technical for conference committee repair

Electronic Frontier Foundation responds to Sec. Williams’ claims that email ballots and on line ballot marking are not hackable

April 22, 2015

The Honorable Secretary of State Williams
Colorado Department of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 200
Denver, CO 80290

Dear Secretary Williams:
We have received a copy of the letter you sent to Representatives Ryden and Nordberg and Senators Hill and Garcia regarding amendments to HB-1130. We thank you for your leadership in doing everything in your power to make sure all military and overseas
voters get a chance to cast a ballot.

We are concerned however about your opposition to L.036 which would prohibit online ballot marking. Your comments regarding scanning and emailing back a marked ballot
sends the wrong message and we worry that you may have been given technically faulty
advice. In your letter you state:

“The state uses an innovative application from Everyone Counts that allows UOCAVA voters to specifically access their ballot online, mark it
and print it out to verify their selections. The concern that the system is hackable is a nonstarter because the voter must still print it, sign it, scan it, and send it back to the clerk’s office.”

Continue reading Electronic Frontier Foundation responds to Sec. Williams’ claims that email ballots and on line ballot marking are not hackable

Dem press release on HB1130 as defective as the bill

Why on earth can’t Democrats be honest here and say what is really wrong and why this bill went back to committee? It would have been adequate to blame the Rs for rushing the bill in the Senate but then acknowledge good reasons for backtracking. Instead pure establishment propaganda. Why? No wonder voters are unhappy with the parties. Both parties.

Comments added inline in [CAPS] below by Harvie Branscomb.
April 6, 2015
Jessica Bralish, Communications Director

At stake: The right to vote in every election for overseas military personnel

DENVER — In a rare procedural move, the Senate Republicans re-sent a bill on military voting rights back to committee.  The bill (HB 15-1130) ensures that overseas military personnel and overseas citizens can exercise their right to vote in every election.


Continue reading Dem press release on HB1130 as defective as the bill